State-centric law appears ill equipped to meet human rights' emancipatory promise in an increasingly pluralistic, unequal world facing climate change. 'Climate justice' has become a counterpoint to hegemonic statist, neoliberal climate approaches. However, few studies address the confluence of competing norms (including rights), power relations and multiple actors in shaping, contesting and reinterpreting climate justice in specific contexts, despite burgeoning human rights and legal pluralism research. This article explores legal pluralism's potential for understanding rights' roles in climate justice through examining Norway. Legal pluralism reveals how Norwegian 'translators' vernacularise transnational climate justice aspects, including international climate law and policy, into relevant movement frames, but within unequal power relations and hegemonic processes. These translators balance encouragement and critique of Norway's high-profile international climate positioning, finding spaces within hegemonic discourses where movements can turn prevalent global, statist frames inward, decentering climate discourses by highlighting Norway's structural links to climate injustice, particularly its petroleum industry. Rights are used in varying ways in both disaggregating diagnostic frames and stressing more prognostic, transformative visions. Increasingly, climate justice and Norwegian 'klimarettferdighet' [climate justice] discourses move from a focus on countering international, statist discourses to domestic distribution and economic transitions. This combines climate justice with Norwegian civic participatory and social democratic norms of active civil society and social movement involvement in socioeconomic transformations, providing potentially resonant frames for tackling climate change.
Introduction
Climate change arises as state-based human rights law already disappoints its emancipatory promise in an increasingly plural global order. Rights must be approached differently if they are to offer an alternative that can challenge hegemonic neoliberal approaches to ecology. 'Climate justice' represents such a counter-narrative, often using rights. Nonetheless, while rights-based global climate governance blueprints generate Fourthly, interactions, spaces, scales, and the actors that move between and within them are uneven and unequal, bearing imprints of history. We must therefore acknowledge political economy and historical power relations. Considering living law as the outcome of historical struggles between unequal participants reflects Gramsci's idea of 'hegemony' as a process between purposeful movements from above and below. 9 For Merry, within these hegemonic processes, 'translators' negotiate between communities, formal standards and institutional openings -resonant frames might insufficiently confront existing practices, while non-resonant frames might be too challenging.
10 'Local' and 'global' go 'beyond spatial referents', with local implying 'recalcitrant particularity' and global 'cosmopolitan awareness'. 11 Legal pluralism imagines, instead, 'multisited' categories without unidirectional global-local or local-global causality:
12 not only is state-based law pluralised, but plural norms are legalised and institutionalised. Both processes can swing from cooption by elite interests in hegemonic processes to recognition of alternative claims; the same norms can be relied on for different understandings of law and divergent framings reflecting contrasting historical moments. Gramsci viewed law within a 'historical bloc', a 'discordant ensemble of (…) social relations' that, in its material base and superstructure, 13 contain 'truce lines' of past struggles. 14 Similarly, Merry recognises 'a temporal dimension' to actor and movement mobilisation, whereby 'knowledge about the world develops slowly'.
15
Rather than offering particular methods, pluralism is an orientation that does not privilege state-based law, but still recognises the influence of state-based norms and institutional openings in actor-movement strategies, and the state's porous nature, the plural actors that constitute its different faces and speak on its behalf in different settings.
In acknowledging actors cannot escape physical or normative contexts, legal pluralism could help recognise climate change as a material factor and a source of socio-legal norms (our responses to climatic changes) affecting rights' lived reality. This introduces 8 Markus (n 6) 387. an ecological dimension to legal pluralism -norms are socially and materially coproduced by unequal (human and non-human) actors in multi-scalar, semi-autonomous socio-ecological fields. Epistemic communities and socio-political constructions of science -scientific pluralism -thus muddy the waters further. Climate change permeates all socio-ecological fields, with overlapping norms and institutions refracting this permeation; thus, legal pluralism could be vital in exploring tensions between rights' universalist aspirations and their context-dependent realisation under climatic changes.
Climate Justice

The 'First Wave': Roots of Climate Justice
Climate justice is a transnational discourse of plural conceptions of climate change and justice from below that compete in hegemonic processes at multiple, overlapping scales. A legal pluralist analysis helps demonstrate this in how actors vernacularise and disaggregate internationalist, statist climate narratives, meeting them, firstly, at the global level, but becoming increasingly multi-scalar and future-orientated. 47 to serve hegemonic interests. Subsequently, parts of the Peoples' Agreement were included 'in brackets' in negotiating texts for the 2010 Cancun COP, including indigenous and 'Mother Earth's' rights. None of these were adopted but gave the impression climate justice was taken seriously in statist procedures. Bolivia and Ecuador's own pursuit of neoliberal resource extraction contradicted their climate justice rhetoric; Cochrane suggests this warns against reifying indigeneity or 'displacing class oppression with notions of cultural diversity', 48 demonstrating how legal pluralism cannot disregard political economy. Cancun thus represented 'an almost total reinscription and subsumption of this "other" discourse' of climate justice. This was a turning point for many climate justice advocates frustrated again in their international engagement . 49 The 2011 Durban COP's results were described by some as 'tantamount to genocide'.
50 Still, Durban witnessed a concerted strategy by several states, increasing 'youth activism', and an 'occupation' by civil society groups, which 'injected a new dynamic' into climate justice and secured more radical targets, some non-market mechanisms and increased adaptation finance. A turn to more multilevel approaches to climate justice was encapsulated by a Bolivian negotiator, who stated 'the key thing is not inside the COP', but 'strong organization from social movements (...) around the whole world'. 
Multi-sited Climate Justice and Rights
From a legal pluralist perspective, simultaneous influx of normative orders (including movement spillover) and institutional openings in the global climate discursive space saw vernacular frames globalised and global frames, including UNFCCC legal norms, vernacularised, as well as crossovers between global frames (especially through human rights). However, the shortcomings of these institutional openings and global frames encouraged a strategic switch away from the global scale, albeit with altered, hybrid frames merging 'local' and 'global'. This decentralisation and hybridisation expanded issues, scales and actors involved in climate justice. For example, 'just sustainability' movements, like 'transition towns', seek 'to transform both dominating and unsustainable practices of production and consumption' and 'rebuild the material relationships we have with (…) resources we use'. 52 This 'pushes beyond the qualifiers "environment" or "climate" (…) understanding that justice itself depends on a stable and predictable set of environmental conditions'.
53
Rights interpretations have played a role in the emergence of multi-sited climate justice. In Derman's analysis of civil society COP discourses, 'uneven responsibilities, vulnerabilities, and impacts' are strategically linked 'to rights language as mobilized in legal doctrine'. Rights assist in disaggregating the UNFCCC's statist principles 'from the national scale to (…) individuals and communities', seeking 'increased recognition and representation of marginalized stakeholders'. ' , and instead acknowledging 'systemic structural conditions' of 'liberal legal subjectivity' and global inequality.
61
Doing so overcomes what Fisher (no relation) calls the 'global trap' -assuming the international is 'the space for the best access to climate justice', despite climate change being 'mediated through multiple local problems' 62 -a familiar issue in rights and legal pluralism, and a dilemma for 'translators' who, echoing Merry, vernacularise transnational climate justice through seeking resonant frames. 63 Translators 'claim their own space' in climate debates but often 'claimed' spaces simply 'feed into the UNFCCC'.
64
As with the CMPCC, particular injustices can be 'redefined as part of wider national injustices' to 'match with (…) global [ We might add a fourth dimension -time -and recognise both diagnostic and prognostic frames. Furthermore, we might think of parallel dimensions, with the pyramid in competition with the statist two-dimensional plane in hegemonic processes.
This provides a heuristic for examining climate justice from legal pluralist and rights perspectives: various symbolic frames (recognition) are used to vernacularise climate justice norms (rights, responsibilities, distributions and procedures) by actors in social fields at different scales (the pyramid's three-dimensional space). Discourses and narratives that emerge, contesting hegemonic discourses across the two-dimensional statist plane, operate at different spaces within the pyramid dependent on which aspects they relate to or combine with in different contexts; at different heights depending on how they are translated at different scales; and emerging at different times depending on historical struggles. Thus, climate justice began by engaging with inter-state and international climate discourses on rights, responsibilities, distributions and procedures through more disaggregated strategies, using recognition to highlight climate injustices; this spatially global and temporally diagnostic frame has gradually deepened within the pyramid by further discourses of recognition and expanded with scales shifting more to the particular level, while temporal perspectives have unfolded towards more transformative, prognostic visions of transition and social change. Rights have played a role in this spatial deepening, scalar expansion and temporal unfolding. take up the ethical implications (…) connected to petroleum export'. 95 Again, international climate law features here; such claims are 'justified by switching the focus from national targets and measures (…) to emphasizing climate change as an international problem', 96 inviting comparisons between Norwegian petroleum and other energy sources. Norwegian responsibility is further diminished -indeed, practically absolved -while giving limited recognition to inter-state distributions by invoking energy poverty. Thus, this narrative hints at transition (primarily through CCS) without changing course. This is accompanied by the suggestion unilateral transition will not only hurt Norwegians (through job and economic losses), but have limited or adverse effects, given 'carbon leakage', whereby industries leave Norway for 'developing' states where environmental standards are lower -yet again supporting an international, statist framing. Norgaard links this to popular arguments emphasising Norwegian's past poverty.
Norwegian Climate Justice Discourses
97
In summary, hegemonic Norwegian climate narratives are dominated by statist, international frames that deflect responsibility, but adopt aspects of justice frames by implying Norwegian petroleum can solve climate and developmental crises. This includes coopting rights in emissions rights and the defence of Norwegians' rights implied by carbon leakage. These narratives, reflecting the political economy of an oildependent state, are carefully woven into existing norms in social fields. The following outlines how, in the context of these hegemonic processes, klimarettferdighet vernacularises climate justice in countering statist, diagnostic narratives, before examining development of more prognostic frames focused on domestic transition in line with Norwegian norms and political economy.
Counter-hegemonic Responses
Like climate justice discourses generally, klimarettferdighet framed itself first and foremost in global, statist terms to critique hegemonic statist framing, amplifying and disaggregating responsibility to focus on Norway, and using recognition of individual and collective injustice to stress procedures, distribution and rights beyond states. This involves several frames.
Firstly, responsibility is expanded to acknowledge historical responsibility. Already in 1996, a Church synod declaration, 'Consumption and Justice', stated Norway has 'through its oil extraction, transport policies and reduction of research on alternative energy sources failed its global responsibilities'. Thus, climate justice has been vernacularised in frames of historical responsibility, intergenerational justice, recognition of Southern actors and carbon budgets to disaggregate diagnostic statist narratives. While these translate more-or-less directly from transnational discourses, including operationalising UNFCCC principles, they merge with existing normative and institutional contexts in two ways. Firstly, they acknowledge (through expanding responsibility) Norwegian petroleum's global contribution -a long-standing concern for klimarettferdighet actors, especially the church and environmentalists, as seen in FIVH's 2010 klimarettferdighet campaign that stresses Norway must 'quickly leave the oil age', countering arguments that 'poor countries need energy' and about 'clean' extraction, and linking this to Statoil's overseas tarsands investments. 110 While assumptions of 'eco-friendly Norway' found by Norgaard bolster exceptionalist arguments for Norwegian petroleum, and many Norwegians appreciate petroleum's contribution to their welfare, challenging petroleum's hegemony is increasingly resonant not only with environmental norms but growing recognition of adverse economic effects of 'oil dependence' in raising prices and monopolising certain skills. 111 Secondly, solidarist norms (vital to development organisations and the church)
are projected onto the inter-state and inter-temporal level, using recognition to emphasise disaggregated distribution, procedures and rights. This includes use of the folk concept of dugnad (collective work community members are expected to participate in). Naturvernforbundet refer to a 'climate dugnad', the share of which must be higher for developed countries. 112 As noted, these are among norms Norgaard identifies that are co-opted in hegemonic discourses to justify Norway's high profile in climate negotiations and continued promotion of petroleum as 'solution'. Industry lobbyists invoke 'solidarity' to defend petroleum. Nonetheless, klimarettferdighet actors increasingly counter this, an NCA, FIVH and Statistics Norway report showed reducing petroleum production would have little effect on poverty (as little is exported to the poorest nations).
113 Through exploiting institutional openings provided by statist, international narratives in hegemonic discourses that protect petroleum interests, klimarettferdighet increasingly employs more multi-scalar and multi-temporal frames. While countering statist diagnoses, they imply a more prognostic, proactive focus on Norway's responsibilities, promoting a turn from the global towards domestic transition.
Turning Klimarettferdighet Inward
This has sparked debate on how climate justice, especially distributions, rights and procedures, manifests itself within Norway, invoking norms of civil society involvement in socioeconomic transitions and social democratic norms, including tripartite cooperation. 114 Scientists Norway that has produced books on green jobs and slowing oil extraction, and a petition ('Slow down Norwegian oil extraction -100,000 climate jobs now!'). One session of their 2014 conference was a 'conversation' on klimarettferdighet, chaired by Bård Lahn, involving Lars Haltbrekken (Naturvernforbundet), Ingrid Naess-Holm (NCA) and John Leirvaag (leader of the Norwegian Civil Service Union, an LO member). The discussion's premise was that 'climate struggle is about democratisation of the economy and society (…) redistribution between North and South, and (…) generations', and Lahn linked these distributional themes to historical responsibility and carbon budgets. Leirvaag stressed Norwegians have undertaken transitions previously by creating security around them, ensuring no particular groups suffer disproportionately, through, for example, taxation to catalyse change, and focusing on research to create new jobs. He stressed LO represents different workers, including in petroleum, and involves them in dialogue. Addressing carbon leakage, Leirvaag suggested Norway's welfare allows it to lead, building green jobs, rather than protecting jobs that must disappear eventually. Haltbrekken also stressed that it is better a transition starts smoothly than suddenly, supporting green jobs. In answering whether there is hope for a just international agreement, Naess-Holm stated both bottom-up and top-down strategies were necessary by movements, especially unions, to influence states, as inter-faith work demonstrates.
development and human rights, merging with civic participatory and social democratic norms to reframe climate change as a threat to both others' and Norwegians' welfare.
In summary, the proactive, prognostic turn in klimarettferdighet vernacularises climate justice by stressing recognition of responsibilities, rights, distributions and procedures within Norway, building on acknowledgement of petroleum dependence and solidarity in diagnostic frames, and augmenting this with civic participation and social democratic norms. Individual and collective dimensions of Norwegians' responsibility, including consumption, are addressed. Increased union involvement has encouraged and been encouraged by this, furthering the socioeconomic, industrial transition focus. While different unions operate differently within hegemonic processes based on politicoeconomic interests, new alliances connect diverse actors, and promote green jobs and transitions across sectors with tools including law and rights (especially the constitutional environmental right and workers' rights). Crucially, this confronts the politico-economic premise of hegemonic narratives by suggesting petroleum dependence threatens rights globally and domestically; it also anchors its solution of state-led socioeconomic transition with significant civil society involvement and tripartite cooperation in norms crucial to the history of the petroleum industry itself.
Conclusion
Legal pluralism empirically examines norms and institutions, including law, in semiautonomous socio-ecological fields where actors construct collective action frames, at multiple scales, within historically-situated hegemonic processes. Climate justice discourses arise from the interaction of lived injustices within particular historical struggles and politico-economic contexts, and institutional openings provided by climate (and non-climate) law and policy. Countering international, statist frames during institutional openings that emerged during the 'second wave' of climate interest, climate justice is increasingly disaggregated, multi-scalar and prognostic. Discursive elements of responsibilities, rights, distributions, and procedures are disaggregated and vernacularised using recognition, employing both diagnostic and prognostic themes in which rights feature prominently.
In Norway, klimarettferdighet actors vernacularise transnational climate justice discourses, including UNFCCC principles, into resonant frames, using recognition to disaggregate statist, globally-scaled discourses around emissions trading, state-financed initiatives and carbon leakage, and increasingly turn climate justice inward to more future-orientated questions of domestic transition. Movements used institutional openings to counter hegemonic narratives by emphasising disaggregated responsibility, in particular linking this to petroleum, and solidarist norms. Well-connected Norwegian climate justice translators quickly vernacularised (sometimes literally translating) klimarettferdighet given their participation in global networks (including NCA in the ACT Alliance). These translators walk the line between encouragement and critique of
